In this dissertation I provide a tenseless account of tensed sentences and tensed belief. I begin by distinguishing tensed theories of time from tenseless theories of time. Tensed theories of time hold that there is a time that is objectively present, and that the moment that is objectively present changes from one moment to the next. I reject tensed theories of time. I deny that there is a time that is objectively present that changes from one moment to the next. (...) Instead, time is in many ways analogous to space and 'now' is in many ways analogous to 'here'. Just as there is no one location that is objectively here, there is no one moment that is objectively now. Nothing metaphysically distinguishes the present moment from past and future moments. ^ There are two major challenges facing the tenseless theory of time. The first challenge is: can a tenseless theory of time provide a plausible account of the truth-conditions for tensed sentences? Tensed sentences such as 'The meeting is now!' provide a prima facie reason in favor of irreducibly tensed properties: the sentence is true if and only if the meeting has the tensed property of being now. I examine existing attempts by tenseless theorists for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that they are unable to provide a complete account of what makes tensed sentences true. I formulate and defend a new tenseless account of the truth-conditions for tensed sentences, the type-context theory, which makes use of David Kaplan's theory of indexicals. ^ The second challenge facing the tenseless theory of time is: can a tenseless theory of time provide a plausible account of our tensed psychological attitudes? Most of our psychological attitudes such as belief, desire, relief, regret and anticipation are irreducibly tensed: we cannot adequate describe such attitudes without appealing to tensed language. I do not take relief in the tenseless fact that I got my wisdom teeth out in 1998. I take relief in the tensed fact that my wisdom teeth were extracted in the past. I do not run to the bus stop merely because I believe that the bus arrives at 8:45. I run to the bus stop because I believe that the bus is arriving now. How can the tenseless theory of time explain the central role that tense plays in our psychological attitudes? I claim that the objects of tensed beliefs are properties. The account I defend is a version of the self-ascription accounts defended by Roderick Chisholm and David Lewis. I argue that such a view can provide a plausible tenseless account of tensed belief. ^. (shrink)

Unfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), (...) as evidenced by metric invariance between countries (CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.07) as well as scalar invariance across genders (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03) and educational levels (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03). Also, lower levels of education, more fear of COVID-19, and more cynicism were weakly associated with stronger conspiracy and health beliefs. The study contributes to knowledge about the structure of unfounded beliefs, and reveals the potential relevance of affective (i.e., fear of COVID-19) and cognitive (i.e., cynicism) factors along with demographics, in endorsing such beliefs. In summary, we obtained cross-cultural evidence for the distinctiveness of unfounded conspiracy and health beliefs about COVID-19 in terms of their structure and correlates. (shrink)

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...) grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

This chapter provides a critical overview of various influential accounts of de se attitudes including those proposed by Frege, Lewis and Perry. It also addresses the charge that there is nothing distinctive about de se attitudes. The second half outlines a widely accepted and influential model of communication and various complications that arise in applying this model to the communication of de se thoughts. The final section provides an overview of the papers in this volume.

In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...) for the truth of tensed tokens and conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I demonstrate that there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of tensed tokens, and there is a true formulation of the date theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I argue that once the views are properly formulated, the A-theorist’s objections fail to make their mark. However, I conclude by claiming that even though there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory and a true formulation of the date theory, the New B-theory nonetheless fails to provide a complete account of the truth and falsity of tensed sentences. (shrink)

When do objects at different times compose a further object? This is the question of diachronic composition. The universalist answers, ‘under any conditions whatsoever’. Others argue for restrictions on diachronic composition: composition occurs only when certain conditions are met. Recently, some philosophers have argued that restrictions on diachronic compositions are motivated by our best physical theories. In Persistence and Spacetime and elsewhere, Yuri Balashov argues that diachronic compositions are restricted in terms of causal connections between object stages. In a recent (...) article, Nikk Effingham argues that the standard objections to views that endorse restrictions on composition do not apply to a view that restricts composition according to compliance with the laws of nature. On the face of it, such restrictions on diachronic composition preserve our common-sense ontology while eliminating from it scientifically revisionary objects that travel faster than the speed of light. I argue that these attempts to restrict diachronic composition by appealing to either causal or nomological constraints face insurmountable difficulties within the context of special relativity. I discuss how the universalist should best respond to Hudson’s argument for superluminal objects, and in doing so, I present and defend a new sufficient condition for motion that does not entail that such objects are in superluminal motion. 1 Introduction2 Diachronic Composition3 Diachronic Composition and Superluminal Objects4 Restricting Diachronic Composition5 Causal and Nomological Restrictions on Composition in a Relativistic Context6 Superluminal Objects and Motion7 Conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and (...) argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis’s theory of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being. (shrink)

I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s (...) account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities. (shrink)

A commonly held idea regarding the nature of time is that the future is open and the past is fixed or closed. This article investigates the notion that there is an asymmetry in openness between the past and the future. The following questions are considered: How exactly is this asymmetry in openness to be understood? What is the relation between an open future and various ontological views about the future? Is an open future a branching future? What is the relation (...) between an open future and the question of whether contingent statements about the future are true or false? Is an open future compatible with a single determinate future? (shrink)

Recent studies indicate that adapting common components of universal healing practices increases the effectiveness of multicultural therapies, especially incorporating initial and reformulated myths. The Socratic method, part of an original philosophical process directed toward therapeutic goals, has long been instrumental to many psychotherapies, but limited in application to dialectical discourse. Through a rediscovery and clarification of the original integrated Socratic-Platonic method inclusive of mythmaking as well as systematic questioning, the authors argue that this new, more comprehensive model provides a foundation (...) for increasing the effectiveness of multicultural psychotherapies. (shrink)

Will it rain tomorrow? Will there be a sea battle tomorrow? Will my death be painful? Wondering about the future plays a central role in our cognitive lives. It is integral to our inquiries, our planning, our hopes, and our fears. The aim of this paper is to consider various accounts of future contingents and the implications that they have for wondering about the future. I argue that reflecting on the nature of wondering about the future supports an Ockhamist account (...) of future contingents according to which many of them are true. Alternative accounts which maintain that no future contingents are true, either by claiming that they are all false or by claiming that they are neither true nor false, face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. Reflecting on wondering in general, and wondering about the future in particular, suggests that in wondering how the future will go, we implicitly assume that there is a determinate fact of the matter. After presenting an attractive account of interrogative attitudes that has been recently proposed by Jane Friedman and outlining some norms governing wondering, I argue that all accounts of future contingents except Ockhamism face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. (shrink)

One stark difference between the past and the future lies in our ability to shape the future in a way in which we are unable to shape the past. This paper investigates what kind of beliefs about the future serve as premises in our reasoning about how to act. If we think about belief in terms of agents representing the world, we cannot lose sight of the fact that agents are part of, and shape, the same world they represent. Beliefs (...) about the future appear to have a circularity about them: on the one hand, they serve as premises for deciding what we will do. On the other hand, what we decide we will do determines what we believe about the future. I argue that beliefs in future-directed counterfactuals play a central role in our practical reasoning and in how we conceptualize the actual future. I defend a robust distinction between future-directed counterfactuals and future-directed indicatives, and, contra Keith DeRose (2010), argue that it is future-directed counterfactuals that we use in deliberation about how to act. I argue that we construe the actual future in hypothetical terms and dependent on what we do now, in contrast to how we construe the actual past. This asymmetry in our belief content about the past versus the future fits well with an account of the open future in terms of counterfactual dependence. (shrink)

In Nothing to Come, Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz provide a sophisticated, compelling, and thoroughly defended account of the growing block theory. This note critically evaluates two aspects of this account. First, it evaluates Correia and Rosenkranz’s attempt at providing a grounding principle for future truths and argues that this principle fails to make progress in explaining why future truths are true. Second, it evaluates Correia and Rosenkranz’s construal of the open future arguing that the asymmetry in openness with respect (...) to the past and future is not plausibly understood in terms of determinism and indeterminism, and in the final section, it evaluates their claim that a growing block theorist is able to maintain that the future is open in a stronger sense than the block theorist. (shrink)

What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...) cases, de se puzzle cases cannot be resolved by objective information alone. Further, there seem to be pure cases of each puzzle: instances of the de se puzzle which do not have a Fregean structure, and instances of Frege’s puzzle, which do not involve de se attitudes. We conclude that the two puzzles are fundamentally different and that the traditional theory of attitudes needs to be amended. (shrink)

The current assessment of behaviors in the inventories to diagnose autism spectrum disorders (ASD) focus on observation and discrete categorizations. Behaviors require movements, yet measurements of physical movements are seldom included. Their inclusion however, could provide an objective characterization of behavior to help unveil interactions between the peripheral and the central nervous systems. Such interactions are critical for the development and maintenance of spontaneous autonomy, self-regulation and voluntary control. At present, current approaches cannot deal with the heterogeneous, dynamic and stochastic (...) nature of development. Accordingly, they leave no avenues for real-time or longitudinal assessments of change in a coping system continuously adapting and developing compensatory mechanisms. We offer a new unifying statistical framework to reveal re-afferent kinesthetic features of the individual with ASD. The new methodology is based on the non-stationary stochastic patterns of minute fluctuations (micro-movements) inherent to our natural actions. Such patterns of behavioral variability provide re-entrant sensory feedback contributing to the autonomous regulation and coordination of the motor output. From an early age, this feedback supports centrally driven volitional control and fluid, flexible transitions between intentional and spontaneous behaviors. We show that in ASD there is a disruption in the maturation of this form of proprioception. Despite this disturbance, each individual has unique adaptive compensatory capabilities that we can unveil and exploit to evoke faster and more accurate decisions. Measuring the kinesthetic re-afference in tandem with stimuli variations we can detect changes in their micro-movements indicative of a more predictive and reliable kinesthetic percept. Our methods address the heterogeneity of ASD with a personalized approach grounded in the inherent sensory-motor abilities that the individual has already developed. (shrink)

I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations (...) of the self-ascription account of tensed belief, one that is compatible with a perdurantist account of persons and the other that is compatible with an endurantist account of persons. I argue that a self-ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self-ascription of relations rather than properties. I argue that whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary personstage or an enduring person, the self-ascription theory provides a plausible B-theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible. (shrink)

Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts, as Lewis called them – raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thought – to wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of (...) two contrasting accounts – a Lewisian one and a Perrian one – in the first section of this paper, in the second I will present a proposal of my own, which is a specific elaboration of the Perrian account. In the first section I will indicate some weaknesses of Perry’s presentation of his view; the proposal I will articulate in the second overcomes them. I will conclude with a brief discussion of reasons for preferring one or another account, in particular regarding the issue of the communication of de se thoughts. (shrink)

This paper embraces the view that we have substantial knowledge of the future and investigates how such knowledge fundamentally differs from knowledge of the past and present. I argue for a new source of context-sensitivity with respect to knowledge attributions arising from presuppositions about reliable belief-forming processes. This context sensitivity has important consequences for knowledge of the future, as well as the appropriateness of assertions about the future. I argue that not only is knowledge of future events typically brought about (...) by fundamentally different processes from those that bring about knowledge of past events, that this is the case is often presupposed in attributing knowledge. I argue that this new source of context sensitivity naturally extends to explaining the recent puzzle of `easy foreknowledge'. (shrink)

There are different ways in which imaginings can involve the first-person. I can imagine skiing down a mountain, looking down the slope, the wind whipping me in the face. I can also imagine myself skiing down a mountain from the outside, adopting the point of view of a spectator watching myself fly down the mountain. I can also imagine that I am someone else entirely, say Angela Merkel, skiing down a mountain. In this paper I develop and defend a new (...) account of the content of first-person imaginings. I first look at two existing accounts, one proposed by Francois Recanati (2007a, 2007b) and the other proposed by Dilip Ninan (2008), and I argue that they lack the resources to model the rich and distinct types of first-person imaginings that we can have. I then present and defend a new account that reconstrues the imagining from the inside vs. imagining from the outside distinction and can accommodate the various ways in which imaginings involve the first-person. (shrink)

Patrick Todd's The Open Future defends the view that all future contingent statements, like ‘It will rain tomorrow’, are false.1 Not only is ‘It will rain tomor.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Background The use of lengthy, detailed, and complex informed consent forms is of paramount concern in biomedical research as it may not truly promote the rights and interests of research participants. The extent of information in ICFs has been the subject of debates for decades; however, no clear guidance is given. Thus, the objective of this study was to determine the perspectives of research participants about the type and extent of information they need when they are invited to participate in (...) biomedical research. Methods This multi-center, cross-sectional, descriptive survey was conducted at 54 study sites in seven Asia-Pacific countries. A modified Likert-scale questionnaire was used to determine the importance of each element in the ICF among research participants of a biomedical study, with an anchored rating scale from 1 to 5. Results Of the 2484 questionnaires distributed, 2113 were returned. The majority of respondents considered most elements required in the ICF to be ‘moderately important’ to ‘very important’ for their decision making. Major foreseeable risk, direct benefit, and common adverse effects of the intervention were considered to be of most concerned elements in the ICF. Conclusions Research participants would like to be informed of the ICF elements required by ethical guidelines and regulations; however, the importance of each element varied, e.g., risk and benefit associated with research participants were considered to be more important than the general nature or technical details of research. Using a participant-oriented approach by providing more details of the participant-interested elements while avoiding unnecessarily lengthy details of other less important elements would enhance the quality of the ICF. (shrink)

The theory of chemical symbiosis suggests that biological systems started with the collaboration of two polymeric molecules existing in early Earth: nucleic acids and peptides. Chemical symbiosis emerged when RNA-like nucleic acid polymers happened to fold into 3D structures capable to bind amino acids together, forming a proto peptidyl-transferase center. This folding catalyzed the formation of quasi-random small peptides, some of them capable to bind this ribozyme structure back and starting to form an initial layer that would produce the larger (...) subunit of the ribosome by accretion. TCS suggests that there is no chicken-and-egg problem into the emergence of biological systems as RNAs and peptides were of equal importance to the origin of life. Life has initially emerged when these two macromolecules started to interact in molecular symbiosis. Further, we suggest that life evolved into progenotes and cells due to the emergence of new layers of symbiosis. Mutualism is the strongest force in biology, capable to create novelties by emergent principles; on which the whole is bigger than the sum of the parts. TCS aims to apply the Margulian view of biology into the origins of life field. (shrink)

v. 1. Formación y liberación del pensamiento cubano (1515-1860). t. 1. Orígenes y formación del pensamiento cubano -- t. 2. Del liberalismo esclavista al liberalismo abolicionista.

El objetivo de este artículo es explicar las características básicas de la concepción aristotélica de la continuidad sostenida a lo largo de su Física. Tal como intentaré mostrar, es imposible comprender realmente qué entiende Aristóteles por “continuidad” si no se comienza por dilucidar la particular posición que tiene la continuidad junto a otros términos, dentro del marco de su teoría física, tales como “sucesión”, contigüidad” y “contacto”. En este punto, mostraré cómo una correcta aproximación a la noción de “continuidad” exige (...) especificar la relación, así como también la diferencia, entre “continuidad” y “contigüidad”, ya que no es del todo claro cómo debemos entender esta diferencia terminológica al interior de la física aristotélica. Luego, y finalmente, mi análisis se concentrará en examinar qué afirma Aristóteles en relación a la “continuidad” propiamente tal. Éste análisis, a su vez, aborda los conceptos más importantes de la teoría aristotélica de la continuidad y aborda, a su vez, el llamado carácter operativo de la concepción aristotélica del continuum.The aim of this paper is to explain the basic characteristics of Aristotle’s theory of continuity in his treatise on Physics. As I shall try to show, it is impossible to really understand what Aristotle means by the term ‘continuity’ unless we place it context with other significant terms he uses in developing the framework of his physical theory, for example: ‘succession’, ‘contiguity’ and ‘contact’. In addition, I will explain the importance of specifying particularly both the relation and difference between the terms ‘continuity’ and ‘contiguity’, since other commentators have placed a variety of interpretations on this terminological difference. Then, and finally, my analysis will concentrate on examining what Aristotle deduces from his theory of continuity. In conclusion, this analysis goes further than any other in detailing and explaining the most important concepts of Aristotle’s theory of continuity. (shrink)

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

Este estudio examina la frecuencia de colocaciones gramaticales verbo + preposición en aprendientes anglófonos de Español como Lengua Extranjera de nivel A2 y B1 bajo el modelo de Análisis Contrastivo de la Interlengua. Para ello, se implementa una tipología colocacional sustentada en un criterio de fijación intermedia de estas unidades. Los resultados muestran mayor frecuencia en el nivel B1, pero no en la variedad de unidades, y un mayor número de usos correctos que en A2. Respecto de las diferencias encontradas (...) según el patrón sintáctico-semántico, las variables competencia, complejidad del patrón y temáticas aparecen como factores importantes para explicarlas en el contexto del corpus de aprendientes examinado. Este trabajo aporta al estudio de las ColGram v+p, y de otros tipos en ELE. (shrink)

Resumen: Este estudio examina la frecuencia de colocaciones gramaticales verbo + preposición en aprendientes anglófonos de Español como Lengua Extranjera de nivel A2 y B1 bajo el modelo de Análisis Contrastivo de la Interlengua. Para ello se implementa una tipología colocacional sustentada en un criterio de fijación intermedia de estas unidades. Los resultados muestran mayor frecuencia en el nivel B1, pero no en la variedad de unidades, y un mayor número de usos correctos que en A2. Respecto de las diferencias (...) encontradas según el patrón sintáctico-semántico, las variables competencia, complejidad del patrón y temáticas aparecen como factores importantes para explicarlas en el contexto del corpus de aprendientes examinado. Este trabajo aporta al estudio de las ColGram v+p, y de otros tipos en ELE.: This study examines the frequency of grammatical collocations verb + preposition in L1-English learners of Spanish as a Foreign Language of levels A2 and B1 under the model of Interlanguage Contrastive Analysis. To this end, a collocational typology based on a criterion of intermediate fixedness was implemented. The results show higher frequency in level B1, but not in the variety of the units, and a greater number of correct uses than in A2. Regarding found differences according to syntactic and semantic pattern, the variables of competence, pattern complexity and theme appear to play an important role in their explanation in the context of the learners’ corpus examined. This work contributes to the study of GramCol v+p and other types in SFL. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to formalize long-term trajectories of human civilization as a scientific and ethical field of study. The long-term trajectory of human civilization can be defined as the path that human civilization takes during the entire future time period in which human civilization could continue to exist. -/- Design/methodology/approach This paper focuses on four types of trajectories: status quo trajectories, in which human civilization persists in a state broadly similar to its current state into the distant future; catastrophe (...) trajectories, in which one or more events cause significant harm to human civilization; technological transformation trajectories, in which radical technological breakthroughs put human civilization on a fundamentally different course; and astronomical trajectories, in which human civilization expands beyond its home planet and into the accessible portions of the cosmos. -/- Findings Status quo trajectories appear unlikely to persist into the distant future, especially in light of long-term astronomical processes. Several catastrophe, technological transformation and astronomical trajectories appear possible. -/- Originality/value Some current actions may be able to affect the long-term trajectory. Whether these actions should be pursued depends on a mix of empirical and ethical factors. For some ethical frameworks, these actions may be especially important to pursue. (shrink)

Appendix 1 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

The current times call for reforms in educational processes. The Covid-19 pandemic had an unforeseen impact on the educational system in all countries. This need for change requires new pedagogies and new methods for teaching and learning. Understanding the need for change is essential for the formulation of adaptive proposals, as well as for the generation of training activities to complement the teaching curriculum. New educational practices lead to a vision of educational quality, with new approaches that allow the continuous (...) integration of knowledge and permanent interaction with the student. This paper presents an analysis of the new teaching methodologies in times of confinement due to the pandemic caused by Covid-19. Keywords: Teaching methodologies, educational system, learning process. References [1]É. Tremblay-Wragg, C. Raby, L. Ménard y I. Plante, «El uso de estrategias didácticas diversificadas por cuatro profesores universitarios: ¿qué contribución a la motivación de aprendizaje de sus alumnos?,» Docencia en educación superior, vol. 26, nº 21, 2021. [2]L. Czerniewicz, R. Mogliacci, S. Walji, A. Cliff, B. Swinnerton y N. Morris, «Enseñanza y aprendizaje académico en el nexo: desagregación, mercantilización y digitalización en la educación superior,» Teaching in Higher Education, vol. 26, nº 2021, p. 16, 2021. [3]S. Dogan y A. Adam, «Aumentar el efecto del desarrollo profesional en la instrucción efectiva a través de comunidades profesionales,» Docentes y docencia: teoría y práctica, vol. 26, nº 3-4, pp. 326-349, 2020. [4]I. M. Torres Salas, «La enseñanza tradicional de las ciencias versus las nuevas tendencias educativas,» Educare, vol. 14, nº 1, pp. 131-142, 2010. [5]B. Fabio, J. Antonio Palomino y J. González Henríquez, «Evaluación y contraste de los métodos de enseñanza tradicional y lúdico,» Revista de Educación física y deportes, vol. 13, nº 94, pp. 29-36, 2008. [6]Y. Benítez y C. Mora, «Enseñanza tradicional vs aprendizaje activo,» Revista Cubana de Física, vol. 27, nº 2A, pp. 175-179, 2010. [7]P. Morales Bueno y V. Landa Fitzgerald, «Aprendizaje basado en problemas,» Theoria, vol. 13, nº 1, pp. 145-157, 2004. [8]R. Gil-Galván, I. Martín-Espinosa y F. Gil-Galván, «University student perceptions of competences acquired through problem-based learning,» Educación XXI, vol. 24, nº 1, pp. 271-295, 2020. [9]E. Ortiz Cermeño, «El aprendizaje basado en problemas,» Perfiles Educativos, vol. 41, nº 164, pp. 208-213, 2019. [10]E. Araos-Baeriswyl, C. Moll-Manzur, Á. Paredes y J. Landeros, «Aprendizaje invertido: un enfoque pedagógico en tiempos de pandemia,» Rev. Atención Primaria, vol. 53, nº 1, p. 117, 2021. [11]V. León-Carrascosa, M. Belando-Montoro y S. Sánchez-Serrano, «Design and validation of a questionnaire to evaluate the service-learning methodology,» Rev.Estudios sobre educación, vol. 39, nº 1, pp. 247-266, 2020. [12]J. Collado-Ruano, M. Ojeda, M. Malo y D. Amino, «Educación, arte e interculturalidad: El cine documental como lenguaje comunicativo y tecnología innovadora para el aprendizaje de la metodología I + D + I,» Rev. Texto livre, vol. 13, nº 3, pp. 376-393, 2020. [13]P. M. Bueno y V. Landa Fitzgerald, «Aprendizaje basado en problemas,» Theoria, vol. 13, nº 1, pp. 145-157, 2004. [14]J. A. Martí, M. Heydrich, M. Rojas y A. Hernández, «Aprendizaje basado en proyectos: Una experiencia de innovación docente,» Universidad EAFIT, vol. 46, nº 158, pp. 11-21, 2010. [15]L. Rojas y N. M. Jaimes, «Canvas LMS y el trabajo colaborativo como metodología de aprendizaje en entornos virtuales,» de Congreso Ibérico de Sistemas y Tecnologías de la Información, CISTI, Bogotá, Colombia, 2020. [16]B. Bordel y P. Mareca, «Results and Trends in educational MOOCs in the engineering area with MIRIADAX platform. A case study,» de 15th Iberian Conference on Information Systems and Technologies, CISTI 2020; Seville; Sevilla, España, 2020. [17]K. Vermeir y G. Kelchtermans, «Innovative practice as interpretative negotiation.A case-study on the kamishibai in Kindergarten.,» Teachers and Teaching: Theory and Practice, vol. 26, nº 3-4, pp. 248-263, 2020. [18]B. Tucker, «The Flipped Classroom: Online instruction at home frees class time for learning,» Education Next, vol. 1, nº 1, pp. 82-84, 2012. [19]M. V. Ledo, N. R. Michelena, N. N. Cao, I. d. R. M. Suárez y M. N. Vialart Vidal, « Aula invertida, nueva estrategia didáctica,» Educación Médica Superior, vol. 30, nº 3, pp. 678-688, 2016. [20]Metodologías activas por medio de las TIC, [Online]. Available: https://www.campuseducacion.com/blog/recursos/articulos-campuseducacion metodologias-activas-por-medio-de-las-tic/?cn-reloaded=1. [Last access: February 14, 2021]. (shrink)

Excelente iniciativa de publicar escritos éditos e inéditos de José Torres Orozco, uno de los últimos representantes del positivismo en México. Juan Hernández Luna presenta los aspectos biográficos del autor como su posición dentro del positivismo mexicano. Es de interés señalar que entre los escritos filosóficos hay varios dedicados a Nietzche. Entre los psicológicos, uno de 1922 se ocupa de Freud"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58.